The United States is the third largest consumer of seafood products in the world. The percentage of imported seafood consumed in the U.S. has steadily increased from 66% in 1999 to over 84% in (NOAA, 2010. Food safety, especially of imported foods and products from developing countries, has raised increasing concerns among American consumers and policy makers. This paper investigates trends and patterns in U.S. import detentions and refusals of seafood products between 2000 and 2010. Data from U.S. FDA import refusal report is used to uncover patterns of detainments and import refusals across major exporting countries, World Bank income classification and time. The analysis in this paper suggests that the FDA"s approach to food safety regulation for seafood at U.S. ports of entry does follow random selection based inspections. Instead, a system of Import Alerts results in targeted inspections and mandatory "flagging" of repeat code violation. We find evidence of increasing levels of seafood shipment detentions without physical examinations targeted at predominantly lower-middle income seafood exporting countries which make up the majority of the U.S. seafood supply.
Introduction
Seafood products are one of the most highly traded commodities. The United States, the world"s largest producer and importer, sources seafood products from over 130 countries. Imported seafood products have been found to consistently rank highest for violations of U.S. import regulations for reasons of adulteration (Buzby and Roberts 2010; Allen et al. 2008 ).
The objective of this paper is to investigate the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) data from import refusal reports of seafood imports into the United States from 2000-2010. Descriptive analysis is used to highlight trends and patterns in seafood import refusals across major U.S. trade partners ordered by WTO income classification and categories of FDA code. The analysis matches FDA product descriptions to international trade data to quantify the economic impact of the FDA"s enforcement of U.S. food safety border regulations on its major trade partners located in developed and developing countries. Previous studies that have used FDA import refusal data ( (Buzby and Roberts 2010; Allen et al. 2008 ) have focused on either refused shipments or total detentions. The following analysis contributes to the literature by updating previous research with actual data until 2010. We also explicitly distinguish between the overall patterns of border detentions shipments of seafood products that were ultimately refused by the FDA. This step allows for a more precise measurement of the impact FDA import refusals had on trade and therefore whether U.S. regulatory policy did act as a barrier to trade for specific countries.
The trade literature largely agrees upon the fact that food safety related standards can amount to "standards as barriers" to trade and frequently violate fairness in trade by disadvantaging particularly poorer developing countries. While essential to assuring domestic food safety, the risk of new trade measures is their potential as a non-tariff barrier to trade, especially for exporters in developing countries who may not have the appropriate infrastructure in place or resources to comply. In contrast to the above view, Jaffee and Henson (2008) argued that the competitive pressure and opportunity provided by emerging food safety standards, the "standards as catalysts" view, may force export oriented countries to quickly adapt to new trade rules to increase their competitive advantages.
The increasing dependence of the U.S. economy on food imports from developing countries have culminated in public pressure that forced the FDA to apply stricter inspection and enforcement measures to assure the safety of imported seafood products (GAO 2010) . Recently, the FDA has been pressured to additionally strengthen its oversight of food imports by improving enforcement methods and increasing available resources (GAO 2010) . The mandatory nature of many food safety policies deployed by the U.S. FDA may pose non-tariff trade barriers to foreign competitors resulting in changes in bilateral seafood trade flows.
Literature Overview
The existing trade literature suggests that food safety standards imposed by developed countries can have harmful effects on trade (Swann, 2010) , and particularly for commodity exports from developing countries (Henson and Loader, 2001; World Bank, 2005; Henson and Jaffee, 2008) . For the case of standards as barriers to seafood trade the papers by Anders and Caswell (2009) and Nguyen and Wilson (2009) For the specific case of seafood exports to the U.S, Anders and Caswell (2009) found that the mandatory implementation of HACCP in the U.S. seafood sector resulted in trade losses for the majority of developing country exporters. However, the analysis revealed that larger players in the international seafood market where able to gain trade and expand their U.S. market share regardless of development status, mostly at the expense of smaller seafood exporters. A similar study by Nguyen and Wilson (2009) confirmed that HACCP standards had a continuous negative effect on seafood trade from all developing countries. But the magnitudes of trade effects differed across seafood products. The above share the common goal of quantifying the impact of food standards on bilateral trade flows, specifically for developing countries. An alternative approach to measuring the impact of food standards in trade is to look directly observe and analysis the extent to which regulatory measures are enforced at border, leading to the refusal of products deemed for import into a country. Observing trends in border refusals of commodities such as seafood can pinpoint countries of origin and/or individual products that caused large number of violations of existing standards and therefore faced a significant barrier. This approach also often provides insights into the reasons behind the rejection of products. By that border refusal information can provide more detailed, policy relevant information on the impact of specific policy measures and their potential impact as barriers to trade.
To date several studies have used import refusal report information to study the impact of border food safety policies, encompassing all food categories. The existing evidence suggests that seafood accounts for a relatively large share of all import refusals at U.S. ports of entry1 (Buzby et al., 2008; Buzby and Regmi, 2010; Gale and Buzby, 2009 ). Papers by Allshouse et al., 2003; Buzby et al., 2008; FAO, 2005; Food and Water Watch, 2007) , focusing exclusively on U.S. import refusals of seafood, concluded that the majority of ultimately refused seafood shipments originated from developing countries. The above studies found that filth, salmonella and listeria were among the most frequent reasons for the violation of U.S. FDA food safety rules for seafood imports. Shrimp was found to be the product associated with the most violations. A report published by the Food and Water Watch (2007) also highlighted the rise of veterinary drug residues in imported seafood products associated with the growth in aquaculture and predominantly products originating from China.
FDA Import Refusal Reports
Mandatory HACCP compliance was implemented in the U.S. seafood market in 1998 as a regulatory food safety measure to mitigate and control seafood-borne health hazards to consumers. The FDA"s statutory authority and responsibility is to protect the health and safety of U.S. consumers by inspecting shipments into the U.S. market at the port of entry that appear to violate one or more of the code regulations.
The border detention of shipments and subsequent inspection by FDA staff, however, does not imply that detained shipments are necessarily in violation of FDA code regulations.
According to Section 801(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act, detention of imports occurs, if they "appear to be in violation of one of the laws enforced by the FDA" and "the appearance of a violation may arise by the examination of physical samples, a field examination, review of entry documents, or based upon the history of prior violations by the same shipper". However, complete sensory and/or laboratory testing is only conducted on about 2% of all imported seafood shipments. Moreover, shipments are not chosen randomly, but according to a set of FDA risk based criteria (Buzby et al. 2010) . For the majority of shipments the FDA relies on self-reported HACCP compliance documentation provided by the (seafood) exporter to the U.S. (Food and Water Watch, 2007) .
One such measure is the issuing of "import alerts". Also known as "flagging", FDA Import Alerts instruct FDA staff to automatically detain without physical examination all imports of the affected product(s) from a listed manufacturer and/or country of origin that fall under a notice until the exporter demonstrates to the FDA that the violation has been corrected (Buzby, 2010) . It is the responsibility of the importer to present the required evidence (usually in the form of test results and/or shipment documentation) that allows the FDA to confirm complies with relevant FDA code regulations.
Data
Two datasets are applied in this paper. The first set of data includes information on annual bilateral trade flows of seafood exports from major countries of origin to the U. following FDA IRR classifications together with the size (quantity in kg) and value of the affected product. Individual IRR records include the shipment"s country of origin, product description, FDA product code, charge or reason for detention, the value ($) and size (kg) of the affected shipment, and final activity that is whether or not the shipment was ultimately released or refused with or without physical examination.
Product description information was categorized into the main seafood classes using the In line with the development of aquacultural production systems around the world and the growth in the demand for popular tropical seafood species the proportion of refusals between species and production system has also changed. Refusals of seafood harvested from aquaculture systems have steadily grown from 1% in 2000 to roughly 11% in 2009. Shrimp products both from aquaculture and wild caught made up 21% of all refusals. However the relation between refusals of wild caught shrimp to aquaculture shrimp of all refused shrimp shipments has leveled out as aquacultural production has become more and more important. Overall, the total number of refused shrimp shipments to the U.S. market has increased over time, shrimp products only account for 14% of all seafood border refusals. In 2009, tuna was the product with a share of 17% of all refusals and peak of 22% in 2008; a significant increase from just over 7% a decade earlier (Appendix, Table A). Table 2 depicts the patterns of the most frequent FDA code violations across country income classes as the percentage share of detained shipments that ultimately were refused entry into the U.S. market. In general, high-income seafood exporters account for a larger proportion of refusals for misbranding code charges. Common violations were lacking required documentation such as "Food Canning Establishment Number (FCE) "needs FCE", "no process", and false or incomplete mandatory "nutrition labeling". Interestingly, although code violations for "no process" and "needs FCE" are directly related to incomplete shipment documentation the FDA classifies these charges as adulteration. This may ultimately lead to an overestimation of the significance and impact of adulteration as a food safety threat associated with imported seafood products.
Over the entire course of the data, however, code violations due to adulteration were the most common reason for the detention and/or refusal of seafood at a U.S. port of entry. Filth, insanitary conditions of shipments were found in over 50% of all shipments detained by the FDA, Shipments contaminated with Salmonella accounted for 23% of all FDA detentions. For all exporters but those from high-income countries FDA code violations for adulteration account for close to 90% of all detentions. Especially in the case of lower-middle income seafood exporters, which account for the largest market share in the U.S., FDA charges almost exclusively are based on Salmonella and generally insanitary product/shipment conditions.
Detention vs. Refusal
Growing public pressure on the FDA to strengthen its oversight and enforcement of U.S. food safety regulations has also included criticisms regarding its reliance on exporter supplied documentation and due process as a substitute for larger numbers of physical examinations of import shipments (Food and Water Watch, 2007) .
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Among the FDA"s strategies to cope with the thousands of seafood shipments arriving in U.S ports every day is the Import Alert system, or "flagging". Based on repeated FDA code violations over time manufacturers, shippers or countries can be "flagged" and trigger the release of an Import Alert by the FDA notifying border staff that each affected shipment and products has to be detained without the need for physical examination (Buzby, 2010) . The procedure of Import Alerts, aimed at disseminating import information on violation trends and issues FDA inspectors, and trigger the intensified surveillance of particular products and/or country of origin may in fact lead to several unintended consequences. Since it is the responsibility of the exporters to provide additional documentation to prove a shipment"s compliance with FDA code regulations Import Alerts, once published, may not be removed or lead to an accumulation of Import Alert over time potentially causing significant entry barriers to the U.S. market. Food and Water Watch, 2007; Gale and Buzby, 2009) . Table 3 seems to indicate a definite bias in food safety related border inspections towards seafood products originating from China. In fact, both Vietnam and Indonesia had higher refusals rates compared to China in 2009. However, both countries poses less than a third of China"s market share in the U.S.
A pattern in the targeting of FDA border detentions is also evident from Table 3 . Here a comparison of patterns and trends in routine detentions, shipment selected for inspection based on a suspected violation of code rules, and detentions without physical examination, based on previous violations and existing Import Alerts. Given this definition one would expect shipments detained without physical examination to have refusal rates lower than for those shipments detained on the basis of historical records. Table 3 Surprisingly, the percentage of shipments from this country group ultimately refused has been lower than the for other income groups (as supported by Table 2 ). The percentage of shipments from lower-middle income countries detained without physical examination that were refused was 5.3% in 2009, compared to 15% from high-income countries, 17.7% from upper-middle income countries and 19.3% from low-income countries. The most significant finding is that the "bias in the FDA's strategy towards food-safety border inspection seems to especially burden lower-middle income countries and as such create a significant barriers to trade from U.S. FDA food safety import regulations for lower-middle income country seafood exporters to the U.S.
 Despite the fact that lower income countries make up the largest proportion of refused seafood imports, both, import market shares, and shares of seafood refusals are concentrated on a smaller number of suppliers.
 Despite the FDA"s Import Alerts and targeted approach, lower-middle income seafood suppliers have been to perform and expand their market share in the U.S. at the expense of mostly high-income country producers (e.g. Norway).
 China, the most important supplier of seafood products to the U.S. is not the most frequent offender of U.S. food safety code and outperforms other middle-low income suppliers such as Vietnam and Indonesia.
 Detentions and refusals of seafood shipments for reasons of adulteration increase with decreasing development status and are highest for lower-middle income countries. Insanitary conditions (filth) and Salmonella are among the most common reasons for refusal all seafood producers but hose from high-income countries.
 Finally, the results found in this paper largely support published results regarding the significant and negative impact of food safety standards (standards-as-barriers hypothesis)
on exports from poorer developing countries. However, our findings also seem to support 
